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Abstract
We report results of an experimental study of multi-object uniform and discriminatory-
price auctions in an environment of publicly known common values, concentrating on an
environment where theory predicts sharply di⁄erent results of the two auction formats. We
￿nd that the bidding behavior in the uniform case exhibits two clear regularities: agents
consistently play weakly dominated strategies by overbidding on the ￿rst unit and have
moderate di¢ culty coordinating on the high payo⁄ (low auction revenue) equilibrium
predicted by theory. However, subjects with experience in the same environment are
better at reducing demand to achieve higher payo⁄. Bidders in discriminatory auctions,
as predicted, tend to submit bids close to value for all units and are not generally successful
in attempts at collusion.
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11 Introduction
During the 1990s the U.S. Treasury Department conducted a large-scale "￿eld experiment"
by auctioning the 2- and 5-year notes using a uniform-price format. Having concluded
that the initial trial was successful in encouraging more aggressive bids, compared with
the alternative discriminatory-auction format (Malvey and Archibald 1998), it, eventu-
ally, extended the use of the uniform-price auctions to sales of other government bonds
as well. Laboratory testing of uniform- and discriminatory-price auctions in the common
value no uncertainty environments, which approximate sales of nearly riskless government
bonds, has been conducted by Goswami et al. (1996) and Sade et al. (2006). Notably,
the results of these studies seem to be inconsistent. In fact, contradicting the Goswami
et al. (1996) ￿ndings, as well as some theoretical predictions, but in accordance with the
U.S. Treasury experience, Sade et al. (2006) ￿nd that uniform auction format results in
higher revenue. The interpretation of the outcomes of these studies is somewhat com-
plicated by equilibrium multiplicity (inherent especially in the uniform-price auctions),
which require multiple (and, perhaps, somewhat ad hoc) re￿nements to obtain clear theo-
retical comparisons. In particular, while theory predicts that low-revenue equilibria exist
in uniform-price settings, the analysis of relatively complicated environments studied un-
til now involves choosing among a large number of equilibria, only some of which imply
low revenues for the auctioneer. It, thus, remains unclear under which conditions such
low-revenue outcomes are likely to be observed. We believe our experimental results, in a
simple environment structured to give sharp theoretical predictions, may help answering
this question.
The basic uniform-price set-up is to auction a number of identical objects and to allow
bidders to submit a schedule specifying how many of these they￿ d be willing to purchase at
each given price. It can be implemented by asking each agent to submit as many separate
bids as there are objects to be auctioned. The highest bids get allocated the objects (ties
resolved randomly) at the uniform market-clearing price. In contrast, in the alternative
discriminatory-price format each winning bid has to be paid in full.
At a ￿rst glance, the uniform-price auction seems an easy generalization of the stan-
dard Vickrey second-price auction However, already Vickrey (1961) observed that when
individual agents may bid for multiple objects, the uniform-price auction is not the ap-
propriate extension. Since then, Wilson (1979), Back and Zender (1993), Ausubel and
Cramton (1996), Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (2005), among others, have shown that
in a wide variety of environments uniform-price (and the related simultaneous-bid ascend-
ing) auctions may (in some equilibria) allow for equilibrium bidder collusion leading to
extremely low seller revenue (this is impossible in the discriminatory auction).
Our approach in this paper is to design an environment, in which low-revenue equilibria
of the uniform-price auctions would be naturally selected. We concentrate on a setting
2(selling a ￿xed number of cash bundles to an identical number of subjects, while allowing
arbitrary non-negative bids) in which a uniform-price auction implies that the unique
equilibrium, surviving one round of elimination of weakly dominated strategies, is highly
collusive, resulting (theoretically) in full surplus extraction by the buyers. In contrast, the
seller should receive (nearly) the entire surplus if a discriminatory-price auction is used in
an otherwise identical situation. In a sense, what we attempt to do is to design perfect
conditions for a low-revenue "disaster" (something that we can deliberately do in a lab)
and see if it materializes.
In the process of testing both auction environments in the lab we discovered that
successful cooperation on low-revenue equilibria is not straightforwardly achieved even
in this case. However, experienced subjects, who have an opportunity to communicate
with each other out of the lab, substantially improve their performance (this result recalls
the earlier ￿nding of Goswami et al. 1996). Notably, out-of-equilibrium collusion in
discriminatory-price auctions, even when attempted, seems di¢ cult for the subject s to
sustain.
Within the larger literature on experimental uniform-price auctions in various envi-
ronments (with exogenous uncertainty), our experimental design is related to Kagel and
Levin (2001).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the description of the
game and of its equilibria. Section 3 explains the experimental design. Section 4 presents
experimental ￿ndings and Section 5 concludes.
2 The Game
Unlike Goswami et al. (1996) and Sade et al. (2006), who sell a large number (respectively,
100 and 26) of objects to relatively numerous (respectively, 11 and 5) bidders, we choose to
concentrate on smaller groups and fewer objects. Throughout the paper, we shall restrict
our attention to a ￿xed number of three bidders i = 1;2;3. In every auction we consider
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(i 2 I); it should be noted that, unlike in the two above-cited studies, arbitrary bids
(including those above value) were allowed.1 For the uniform-price auctions the winners
have to pay the same market-clearing price p (we shall assume that all ties are resolved
randomly). We choose this price to be equal to the highest loosing ((n + 1)st-highest) bid.
In every auction, therefore, an agent￿ s payo⁄ will be equal to (v ￿ p) times the number
1In practice, this was implemented by using graphical software to allow subjects to submit fractional
bids on a very ￿ne grid (without loss of generality we shall assume that the bids are ordered: k > j implies
bij ￿ bik).
3of objects s/he wins and the revenue of the seller is equal to np. In contrast, in the
discriminatory-price auctions each winning bid gets paid in full.
As usual, in the uniform-price auctions there is a continuum of Nash equilibria. Going
back to Vickrey (1961) weak dominance has been considered a suitable re￿nement for
analyzing second-price and uniform auctions. As in second-price auctions, every weakly
undominated strategy involves never bidding above value, but submitting the full-value bid
for, at least, one object (in fact, the argument is, essentially, the same as the one originally
employed by Vickrey 1961). If one assumes that others, playing undominated strategies,
have, in total, submitted, at least, 2 "honest" bids, then, for a two-object auction, there
is no strategy that would result in a positive payo⁄. However, if the same assumption is
made by a participant in a three-object auction, there is, among his/her own undominated
strategies, one that is always a best response, irrespective of which undominated strategies
his/her competitors choose. Indeed, if s/he submits more than one bid equal to value, s/he
guarantees the zero payo⁄for him/herself (as well as for the others). Lowering the second-
largest bid ensures that it would not be winning, but it still might determine the clearing
price. Hence, no matter what the others do (other than play an undominated strategy)
setting the second bid as low as possible is optimal! The same argument allows one to
reduce the number of equilibria in 4-unit auctions as well, but the multiplicity remains
due to the asymmetry of this setting: unless the bidders can resolve who gets the fourth
object, competition will drive up their second-largest bids, and dominance alone does not
allow those to be pinned down. Finally (this follows, for instance, from Theorem 3 in Beck
and Zender 1993), in discriminatory auctions the seller is guaranteed to be receiving the
entire surplus, as all bids have to be equal to value (this is implied by the continuity of
the bid space: if bids were restricted on a discrete grid, equilibrium underbidding would
be possible; thus, choosing, in practice, a very ￿ne grid allows us to further di⁄erentiate
between the uniform- and discriminatory-price predictions). The following summarizes
theoretical predictions for the auction environments in this paper:
Proposition 1 (i) In the uniform-price auctions, given any number of objects n, for
each agent i 2 I = f1;2;3g any strategy bi = (bi1;bi2;:::bin) such that bi1 6= v is weakly
dominated by b0
i = (v;bi2;:::bin).
(ii) In the uniform-price auctions if n = 2 then in every Nash equilibrium in weakly
undominated strategies the clearing price p = v:
(iii) In the uniform-price auctions if n = 3 then if agents eliminate all weakly domi-
nated strategies of other bidders, the strategy bi = (v;0;0) weakly dominates (v;x;y) for
any v > x;y > 0. This implies the clearing price p = 0.
(iv) In the uniform-price auctions if n = 4 then for every agent bidding bi = (b1;b2;b3;b4)
such that b3b4 6= 0 is weakly dominated by bidding (b1;b2;0;0) in every pure strategy Nash
equilibrium there must be at least one agent bidding bi2 ￿ v
2.
4(v) In the discriminatory-price auctions Nash equilibrium implies that at least n highest
bids bij are equal to value v
Proof. See appendix.
3 Experimental Design
All experimental sessions were conducted at Instituto Tecnol￿gico Aut￿nomo de MØxico
(ITAM) in Mexico City and the subjects were undergraduates recruited in introductory
economics courses. The experiments were computer-administered. Each experimental
session had 15 to 30 participants per session.
During each session a constant number n of identical objects were repeatedly auctioned
to each three-person group using the above-described uniform-price or discriminatory-price
format. For each period agents were randomly matched into groups of three to participate
in an auction (groups were randomly formed anew after each period and agents were not
aware with whom they were playing in each round). The total value of all objects on
sale to each group randomly varied each period between MN$20 and MN$100 Mexican
pesos (slightly less than US$2 to US$10). This value was announced to agents at the
beginning of each session before they made their bids and they were explicitly told that
other members of the group received the same announcement. The agents had to make
n non-negative bids (not exceeding 100
n ). After each round, agents learned the size of the
top (n + 1) bids in their auction.
We conducted a total of 15 uniform-price sessions with 2, 3, or 4 objects sold and
6 discriminatory-price sessions with 3 objects sold. In addition, during the same time
frame, we conducted 8 sessions of single-object second-price auctions and 2 pilot sessions
of uniform-price auctions with, respectively, 6 and 15 objects sold (we report the results
of these sessions, conducted for a separate study, in Elbittar and Gomberg 2007). Each
session consisted of 5 practice periods followed by 20 periods of play for money. The total
duration of a session (including detailed discussion of instructions and answering subjects￿
questions) was somewhat under 2 hours.
At the beginning of each session agents received a balance of MN$60 pesos. All earn-
ings/losses were added each period to this balance. If a subject￿ s balance fell below MN$20
pesos s/he was not allowed to bid further and was paid that remaining balance (in a cou-
ple of cases, where a subject￿ s balance fell below zero - in no case this amount was worth
more than a few U.S. cents - they were paid nothing). Since in this case the number of
subjects in the room was no longer divisible by 3, some subjects would be randomly chosen
each period not to participate (consequently, up to the period 19, the termination time
remained random for individual subjects; our results seem to be robust to eliminating the
data from period 20). After session 20 the accumulated balance was paid out to subjects
in cash.
5Treatment No Experience Relevant Experience 1-object experience
2-object uniform 2 sessions 2 sessions
3-object uniform 4 sessions 2 sessions 1 session
3-object discrim. 4 sessions 2 sessions
4-object uniform 2 sessions 2 sessions
Table 1: Treatments Run
In order to study the impact of experience and communication on outcomes, we de-
liberately recruited subjects who had participated in earlier sessions. To encourage them
returning, those who had participated in at least one prior session were o⁄ered an ad-
ditional MN$60 participation fee for each new session they took part in. In order to
facilitate communication among experienced subjects we made a particular e⁄ort to re-
cruit participants in a given prior session to return together for another session. In these
repeat sessions, experienced subjects were mixed with new inexperienced subjects. Sub-
jects were not told that they would come back for the same experiment, and, in fact,
for one three-object session we invited subjects "trained" in a single-object second-price
auction. No attempt was made to prevent pre-session discussion of the experiment (in
fact, such communication was repeatedly observed). Overall, there does not exist a way
for us, without further experiments, to separate the e⁄ect of experience per se, and that
of communication between subjects during the period between sessions. Even though, for
brevity, in what follows we shall consistently refer to ￿experience￿ , we are cognizant of the
possibility that what matters is the ability of subjects to communicate outside the lab.
Table 1 summarizes the treatments we ran.
4 Results
We concentrate on, ￿rstly, trying to determine whether the theoretical predictions of
Proposition 1 are observable in the lab and, secondly, on the role experience (both within
a session and in prior sessions) plays in determining the subject behavior. Our results,
broadly, show two phenomena in the uniform-price auctions: agents tend to overbid on
their higher bid, and, though reducing the size of their further bids (we shall call this
demand reduction in what follows), do not, most of the time, do this su¢ ciently to reap
high predicted payo⁄s. Neither overbidding on the highest bid, nor the demand-reduction
on the second-highest bids is normally observed in the discriminatory-price auction (except
in a small group of overbidding subjects that quickly exit due to bankruptcy).
As the subjects received a MN$60 peso show-up fee which they could have safely
preserved by never overbidding (bidding above value) in any auction. Thus, playing
undominated strategies would imply that no agent ever receives a total payo⁄ of less then
6Treatment No Experience Relevant Experience 1-object experience
2-object uniform 51/60 61/51
3-object uniform 45/42/54/49 90/66 47
3-object discrim. 53/53/59/54 62/96
4-object uniform 65/46 210/71
Table 2: Average Payo⁄s per subject in each session (pesos)
MN$60 pesos. In fact, for the two-object auctions, in which the object price should be
equal to value, this payo⁄ is indeed what proposition 1 suggests for the subject payo⁄s
after any number of experimental sessions. In contrast, in 3-object auctions the proposition
suggests that in each auction one object should be assigned to each subject at no cost.
Since the total value of objects on sale in each period averaged $60 pesos, this surplus
(shared equally among the three bidders in each auction) should have accumulated, on
average, MN$400 pesos after 20 rounds. The total predicted payo⁄ for these sessions
(including the show-up fee) was, therefore, equal to MN$460 (over US$40) per agent. For
the four-object auction proposition 1 provides no precise prediction for payo⁄s, though the
low revenue equilibria, as in the three-object case, are still possible. In the discriminatory-
price auctions the predicted payo⁄is the initial $60 pesos. Table 2 presents the empirically
observed average payo⁄s (in pesos, excluding the additional MN$60-peso show-up fee paid
to experienced subjects for a repeat participation) per subject for each session.
Of the 13 sessions where subjects were not recruited to have experience in the same
auction type, in 12 sessions agents on average lost between a few centavos (one of the
two-object sessions) and 18 pesos, where inaction would have guaranteed them no losses!
The improvement in sessions for which some of the subjects were recruited from the pool
of those with experience in the same auction format is noticeable: of the 8 such sessions
in only 1 there are any losses and in all four 3- and 4-object sessions there are substantial
over the course of the experiment. In one of these sessions (a 4-object session) the gains
are, in fact, quite striking: each agent went home with, on average, $MN210 pesos (almost
US$20, nearly half of the maximum predicted). Still, in the rest of these sessions payo⁄s of
the magnitude comparable to the prediction did not materialize. Notably, sizeable gains
were recorded in one of the discriminatory-price sessions, where no such gains should have
been possible in equilibrium.
Table 3 presents the summary statistics for the bids (as a proportion of value). The
highest bids in uniform-price auctions, on average, show marked overbidding. There is
also noticeable bid reduction for lower bids (especially pronounced in 4-object auctions),
with extremely high standard deviations re￿ ecting bimodal bid distributions. In contrast,
in discriminatory auctions we obtain ￿ at bids at close to value. The picture becomes
even more suggestive if we only consider subjects with prior experience, who seem to be
7Treatment Highest bid 2nd bid 3rd bid 4th bid
2 unif. all (1854 obs.) 1.110 (0.356) 0.760 (0.446)
2 unif., same exp. (476 obs.) 1.073 (0.229) 0.560 (0.435)
3 unif. all (3045 obs.) 1.159 (0.423) 0.856 (0.472) 0.726 (0.445)
3 unif, 1-obj. exp.(287 obs.) 1.092 (0.287) 0.920 (0.288) 0.827 (0.308)
3 unif, same exp. (753 obs.) 1.147 (0.381) 0.599 (0.451) 0.510 (0.431)
3 disc. (2130 obs.) 0.987 (0.184) 0.967 (0.200) 0.935 (0.236)
3 disc., same exp.(660 obs.) 0.873 (0.265) 0.853 (0.281) 0.821 (0.303)
4 unif. all (1122 obs.) 1.211 (0.489) 0.762 (0.552) 0.591 (0.536) 0.527 (0.492)
4 unif., same exp. (315 obs.) 1.187 (0.410) 0.540 (0.469) 0.335 (0.433) 0.303 (0.408)
Table 3: All Bidders. Average bids as a proportion of value, general and by experience
type (standard deviation in brackets)
Treatment/Experience (obs.) Highest 2nd bid 3rd bid 4th bid
2 unif./ no exp. (1378 obs.) 4 (0.3%) 120 (8.7%)
2 unif./ same exp. (476 obs.) 0 (0.0%) 130 (27.3%)
3 unif./ no same exp. (2292 obs.) 7 (0.3%) 161 (7.0%) 271 (11.5%)
3 unif./ same exp. (753 obs.) 2 (0.3%) 220 (29.2%) 256 (34.0%)
3 disc./ no exp. (1770 obs.) 13 (0.7%) 21 (1.2%) 41 (2.3%)
3 disc./ same exp. (660 obs.) 31 (4.7%) 32 (4.8%) 42 (6.4%)
4 unif./ no exp. (807 obs.) 1 (0.1%) 151 (18.7%) 216 (26.8%) 225 (27.9%)
4 unif./ same exp. (315 obs.) 0 (0.0%) 127 (40.3%) 195 (61.9%) 203 (64.4%)
Table 4: Number of bids equal to or lower than 1 peso (share of total number of bids)
8particularly good at demand reduction on lower bids (high standard deviations still being
observed) in all treatments (even in the two-unit auctions where this does not normally
result in higher payo⁄s). Interestingly, subjects with experience in single-unit auctions
do not seem to reduce demand when given a chance to play in a three-unit auction. A
noticeable reduction of all bids in the discriminatory auctions comes almost entirely out
of a single session.
Table 4 reports how often bidders came close to full demand reduction (predicted
by theory for at least some uniform-price auctions). Few subjects ever submit all their
bids this low in the uniform-price auctions, though some do in the discriminatory-price
treatment. However, the full demand reduction becomes fairly common on the second
bid, especially with experience: 27% of bids by bidders with relevant experience in the
2-object treatment, 29% in the 3-object uniform-price treatment, and 40% of bids in the
4-object treatment belong to this category. Interestingly, only in the 4-object treatment
there is a further substantial increase of such low bids: nearly 62% of third-highest bids
in the 4-object auctions do not exceed MN$1 peso. This further reduction suggests that
second-highest bids might have been elevated by competition for the 4th unit. Second-
and third-highest zero bids in discriminatory-price auctions are comparatively rare.
To study demand-reduction (or lack thereof) in multi-unit auctions we separately es-
timated the demand functions for the multi-unit auctions, using the GLS random e⁄ects
models. The independent variable in all regressions is the bid as a proportion of object
value. The saexperience variable is a dummy, taking value 1 for bids by subjects with
experience in the same treatment. Similarly, 1uexperience dummy stands for the subjects
with experience in single-unit auctions. The continuous period variable is there to cap-
ture bid dynamics. Finally, the bankrupt dummy captures the behavior of those subjects
who were forced to stop bidding before the 20th round by early bankruptcy. The 2ndbid
variable is the dummy for the second bid, the coe¢ cient on which may be interpreted as
the di⁄erence between the highest and the second bids (essentially, the demand reduction
we are interested in) and the 2ndbid=saexperience variable is a dummy for the second
bids of experienced subjects, designed to capture the di⁄erence between the second bids of
inexperienced subjects and the same for experienced subjects. The rest of the second bid
variables are constructed analogously. The dummy variables for the lower bids are nested,
so that the coe¢ cients can be directly interpreted as demand reduction from the higher
bids. This is done by setting the 2ndbid dummy equal to 1 both for second and third
bids, and setting the 3rdbid dummy to 1 for the third bid only; the interaction dummies,
such as 3rdbid=bankrupt the 4thdbid=period variables are constructed similarly. Thus,
the coe¢ cient on the 3rdbid can be interpreted as the average amount by which subjects￿
third bids are smaller than their second bids and 4thdbid=saexperience shows how the
experienced subjects di⁄er from inexperienced subjects in terms of the reduction from the
3rd to the 4th bid. These regressions are presented in Table 5 and the estimated ￿rst
9period demands are plotted in Figure 1.
What we observe is that, whereas the highest bids in uniform-price auctions do re￿ ect
overbidding, the second bids in all uniform-price auction environments are substantially
(15% to 36% of value lower), and prior experience induces a further (22% to 32% of value)
reduction. In the four-object treatment there was further demand reduction by some
12% of value from the second to the third bid (in the three-object treatment, experienced
subjects reduced their demand by roughly the same proportion as inexperienced), possibly
signifying elevated second bids due to the competition for the fourth object sold (a further
minor reduction in demand on the fourth bid occurred only among inexperienced subjects).
In contrast, in the discriminatory-price auctions there is no overbidding, but rather slight,
though statistically signi￿cant (about 4% of value) underbidding even on the highest bid,
which substantially increases (by about 13%) as a result of prior experience (it should be
noted that this last decrease is almost entirely due to the outcomes of a single experimental
session). The demands in the discriminatory auctions are remarkably ￿ at, compared to
those in the uniform auctions, with only a slight reduction beyond the highest bid.
Only in two of the 4 environments were we able to detect substantial intra-session
dynamics. In three-unit uniform-price auctions there was a slight increase of the high-
est bids during the course of a given session, but it was more than overwhelmed by a
simultaneous substantial decrease in second bids (over the 20 periods the second bids in
comparison to the highest bids decreased by about 14% of value beyond the initial 15%
di⁄erence). Though non-negligible, this e⁄ect was small compared to decrease in second
bids exhibited by subjects that return for a follow-up session. In contrast, in the three-
object discriminatory-price auctions we observed signi￿cant intra-session increase in both
the highest and second bids (the 6% by which the highest bids grew over 20 periods is
more than the size of the initial underbid by inexperienced subjects and would remove,
roughly, half the initial underbid by experienced subjects). No signi￿cant intra-session










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2 Units Uniform Price Auction
No Exp.
Exp. with 2 Units




























3 Units Uniform Price Auction
No Exp.
Exp. with 3 Units




























3 Units Discriminatory Price Auction
No Exp.
Exp. with 3 Units




























4 Units Uniform Price Auction
No Exp.
Exp. with 4 Units
Student Version of MATLAB
Figute 1: Demand Functions
5 Conclusions
In an experimental no-uncertainty setting with common values we ￿nd that subject behav-
ior substantially di⁄ers between uniform-price and discriminatory-price auctions. Though
the former do not readily lead to low-revenue equilibria even when these are the only
ones surviving two rounds of iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies, some
agents do make an e⁄ort to reduce demand. If experienced agents are recalled into the
lab, having been able to think through and/or communicate the right equilibrium to each
other, the demand-reduction e⁄orts become more pronounced, and, frequently, successful.
In addition, at least in the three-object environment, intra-session dynamics reinforced
the observed demand-reduction. In contrast, the discriminatory-price auctions result in
agents submitting ￿ at demands, with only small decrease from the highest to the second
bid. While we do observe attempts at out-of-equilibrium collusion by experienced subjects
12in the discriminatory auctions, these are not entirely successful, substantially unraveling
during the course of the experimental session. Low revenue outcomes were obtained in
both auction types in sessions with experienced subjects.
It should be noted, that the uniform-price revenue is somewhat increased compared to
the discriminatory-price revenue due to a consistent pattern of overbidding (i.e., playing
weakly dominated strategies) in uniform uniform-price auctions. This, of course, recalls
the well-established experimental ￿nding of Kagel et al. (1987) about the consistent over-
bidding in the second-price auctions, which has itself spawned an important literature
(see, for instance, Kagel and Levin 1993, or Harstad 2000). No such overbidding nor-
mally occurs in discriminatory-price auctions. Still, it seems that equilibrium collusion in
uniform-price auctions was substantially more successful than out-of-equilibrium collusion
in discriminatory-price auctions.
136 Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. (i) This follows the standard dominance argument for second-price auctions.
Consider the choice vector of bids b1 by agent 1 (as the game is symmetric this is without
loss of generality), given any pro￿le of bids b2,b3 If the total number of bids bjk > v
(j 6= 1) is smaller than n then setting b11 ￿ v gains an object at some price p ￿ v that
is independent of b11. Otherwise, if the number of bids bjk > v (j 6= 1) is bigger than
or equal to n, any b11 > v guarantees that p ￿ v, in which case the agent weakly prefers
to have chosen any b11 ￿ v. Clearly, no matter what the bids by others, b1 = (v;x;y)
dominates (b;x;y) for any v ￿ x;y ￿ 0 and any b 6= v.
(ii) If n = 2 and all agents play a weakly undominated strategy, there are no bids
above v, and, at least, three bids bjk = v, which guarantees that the price p = v no matter
what else the bidders do.
(iii) If n = 3 and all other agents play a weakly undominated strategy then there are
no bids above v and, at least, two bids by other agents such that bjk = v. Then the only
way for an agent 1 (once again, without loss of generality) to win more than one object
is by setting b11 ￿ b12 ￿ v. But that guarantees that the price p ￿ v in which case
he can￿ t have positive payo⁄s . Furthermore, any bid b12 is either the fourth-highest (in
which it determines the price), or not: in the former case agent 1 prefers to set it as low
as possible, and in the latter s/he does not care what it is. Hence, setting b1 = (x;0;0)
weakly dominates any b0
1 = (x;y;z);x ￿ y;z > 0, assuming the agent expects others to
play weakly dominant strategies.
(iv) If other agents play a weakly undominated strategy then there are, at least, 2
bids bik = v. Therefore, the only way for a bidder j to make his third bid winning is by
setting bj1 ￿ bj2 ￿ bj3 ￿ v, so that he can￿ t have positive payo⁄s from winning (the rest
of the argument is as in (iii). Furthermore, suppose for all agents i 6= j for all k = 2;3;4;
bik < v
2. Clearly, setting any bj1 ￿ bj2 = v gains two objects at the price p < v
2, ensuring
a payo⁄ of strictly more than v, which is strictly bigger than the payo⁄ from winning
a single object at any non-negative price. Therefore, if all three agents propose setting
bj2 < v
2 there will always exist a pro￿table deviation by an agent not winning more than
one object. It remains to consider the strategy pro￿les with tied second bids, where all
agents have at least a 1/3 probability of gaining the second object. Clearly, an arbitrarily
small increase of the second bid by any agent would result in him/her getting the second
object for sure, strictly increasing the payo⁄, so such a tie at less than half of value would
still not be an equilibrium.
(v) Given a continuos price space, if the n￿ th-largest bid is less than v, submitting a
bid between it and value gains an object at less than value, without a⁄ecting the prices
of other objects an agent might obtain. Overbidding always incurs a loss.
147 Appendix B: Experimental Instructions and Proceedings for a 3-unit uniform-
price auction
The following is the verbatim translation (from Spanish into English) of experimental instruc-
tions administered to subjects at ITAM (the Spanish original is available from the authors upon
request).
Instructions
This is an experiment about decision-making in auctions. The CONACYT has provided
money for this experiment. The instructions are simple and, if you follow them carefully and
take good decisions, you may win a CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF MONEY, which shall be
PAID OUT IN CASH at the end of the experiment.
General Proceedings.
In this experiment you shall participate in an auction as a buyer of a ￿ctitious good. The
experiment shall consist of 25 periods of buying: 5 practice periods and 20 periods to be played
for money. The monetary value of the good shall be randomly chosen for each period between
$20.00 and $100.00 pesos. Any value within this interval shall have the same probability of being
chosen. The value of the good in each period shall be chosen independently from the values in
the previous periods.
Once chose, the value of the good shall be divided into three
2 fractions, which shall be sold
simultaneously but separately. Your job shall be to o⁄er the money for the distinct fractions,
while competing with other buyers. The value for each fraction (VF) of the good is the value of
the entire object, divided into 3. For instance, if the value of the good is $100.00 pesos, the value
for each fraction shall be $33.30. If the value of the good is $20.00, the value for each fraction
shall be $6.60.
In each period groups of three buyers shall be formed. In each group the buyers shall compete
for the fractions of the same good. The membership of each group shall change randomly, so that
the same group shall be formed by di⁄erent buyers in each period. You shall never know with
whom you are participating. The value of the good shall be the same for all members of a group,
and may be distinct for each group.
Speci￿c Proceedings.
At the beginning of each period each buyer shall write and send a bid for each fraction of the
good. The three highest bids shall obtain the value equal to that of a fraction of the good. In
case of a tie among the bids, the computer shall randomly choose the three winning bids. Nobody
can o⁄er for a fraction of the good less than $0 pesos or more than $33.30 pesos. Neither it is
possible to o⁄er more for a second fraction than for the ￿rst one, nor for the third fraction than
for the second one.
The price to be paid for each fraction shall be the amount equal to the fourth largest bid
3.
Thus, the monetary gain (or loss) for each fraction received by a winner shall be equal to the
value of the fraction less the price to be paid for a fraction. The other buyers shall get the payo⁄
of zero. The total gain of a buyer shall be equal to the sum of gains (or losses) for all the objects
obtained.
At the end of each round, the participants of each group shall learn the winning o⁄ers, the
price paid and their individual gains (or losses). After this, they shall proceed to the next round.
Example:
2In this particular session, the good was divided into three. The number of divisions varied
across sessions.
3The italicized part changes in di⁄erent treatments. In all n￿fraction uniform treatments it
is the (n + 1)st-largest bid, instead of the "fourth largest bid". In the discriminatory auctions
the words are replaced with "to each winning bid".
15For an example we shall now look at a table with o⁄ers submitted buy a group of buyers:
buyers C1, C2 and C3 have given an o⁄er for each of the fractions of the good. The three highest
o⁄ers in the group are marked by a double asterisk: 20.55 - C1, 16.50 - C2, 15.50 - C1. The
winners of the three fractions of the good shall pay the fourth highest bid: 13.40, which is masked
by a single asterisk. The gain (or loss) for each fraction is shown in the last column, where the
fraction to be paid is subtracted from the value per fraction.
Buyer Fractions Bids Winners Price Bene￿t
F1 20.55 ** VF-13.40
C1 F2 15.50 ** VF-13.40
F3 10.00 0.00
F1 16.50 ** VF-13.40
C2 F2 12.40 0.00
F3 12.40 0.00
F1 13.40 * 0.00
C3 F2 12.50 0.00
F3 10.00 0.00
Do you have any questions about this example?
Exercise:
For an exercises and to clarify doubts, indicate with double asterisks the three winning o⁄ers
and with a single asterisk the price that would be paid for each of the fractions. Assuming the
value or a fraction is VF, indicate in the last column what shall be the gain of each buyer for
each unit.










Do you have any questions about the exercise?
Initial balance, accumulated balance and minimal balance.
Each buyer shall start the experiment with the initial balance of $60 pesos. The total gains
16(or losses) of each round shall be added (or subtracted) from the balance accumulated in the
previous period.
If the balance of a buyer for any period is less than $20 pesos, he shall not be allowed to
continue participating. He shall be paid out his ￿nal accumulated balance and shall have to
leave. In case the balance is negative, he shall receive no payment.
In case all groups cannot be formed due to the exit of some of the participants, the computer
shall randomly form as many groups as possible. The participants that cannot be included in
a group for certain period shall have to wait for the following rounds to be able to participate
again as buyers.
Payment procedures.
Your balance accumulated at the end of the last round shall be paid out in cash at the end
of the experiment.
Do you have any questions about the instructions?
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